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ABSTRACT
Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their
executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures
that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the
value of pension benefits significantly undermines the accuracy of existing estimates of executive
pay, its variability, and its sensitivity to performance companies. Studying the pension arrangements
of CEOs of S&P 500, we find that the CEOs' plans had a median actuarial value of $15 million; that
the ratio of the executives' pension value to the executives' total compensation (including both equity
and non-equity pay) during their service as CEO had a median value of 34%; and that including
pension values increased the median percentage of the executives' total compensation composed of
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  When Fannie Mae CEO Franklin Raines was pushed out in December 2004, he 
departed with a generous package of retirement benefits. Fannie Mae will pay Raines 
an annual pension of $1.4 million for the rest of his life and the life of his surviving 
spouse. The actuarial value of this pension benefit — the present value of the stream 
of payments Fannie Mae shareholders should expect to make over time — was about 
$24 million. This pension value constituted a significant component of Raines’s total 
compensation at Fannie Mae, and it substantially weakened the link between 
Raines’s total pay and his performance.1  How common are pension plans, like this 
one, that comprise a substantial fraction of an executive’s total pay? How important 
are such payments to a complete assessment of the executive compensation 
landscape? These are the questions that we investigate in this paper.  
 Existing  disclosure  rules  significantly complicate these seemingly 
straightforward questions because they do not require companies to place a 
monetary value on the pensions to which executives are entitled.2  Pay Without 
Performance, a recent book co-authored by Jesse Fried and one of us, suggests that 
firms use retirement benefits to provide executives with substantial amounts of 
“stealth compensation” — compensation not transparent to shareholders – that is 
largely decoupled from performance.3 The “camouflage” role of retirement benefits 
might, in part, explain their heavy use. Whatever explains the use of pension plans 
and other retirement benefits, assessing their magnitude and overall effects on the 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of Raines’s retirement benefits, see Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 
Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, 
and Camouflage (Working Paper Jan. 2005), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=653125. 
2 Although proxy rules require some disclosure of executive pension benefits, see Executive 
Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, 1992 Transfer Binder Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) paragraph 85,056, the rules do not require that issuers disclose the cost of these 
pensions to their shareholders. Because it can be difficult for investors to ascertain the value 
of these pension benefits from the firms’ limited disclosures, see infra text accompanying 
notes 10-13, shareholders are often unaware of the magnitude of these benefits. 
3 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).   2
link between pay and performance is critical to obtaining a complete picture of the 
executive compensation landscape.  
  Investors currently lack such a picture. To be sure, the press has from time to 
time described the pension arrangements of particular executives in detail.4 Recently, 
for example, the media has discussed the pensions that Franklin Raines and Carly 
Fiorina received after departing from their respective firms.5 But prior research, 
media coverage, and existing datasets have not provided systematic evidence about 
the magnitude and variance of pension values — and their effects on the sensitivity 
of executive compensation to performance — in a representative sample of 
companies.6 
  Standard datasets of executive pay generally include only those components 
of compensation for which a precise monetary value is disclosed in companies’ 
public filings. Estimating the value of pension benefits requires additional research 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, A King’s Ransom in Retirement Benefits: GE Pays Ex-CEO Millions a 
Year in Pension, Perks, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2002, at E1 (detailing the significance of Jack 
Welch’s pension benefits); Daniel Kadlec, How to Get Paid: Stock Options Still Make Sense, But 
the Boss is Getting Other Goodies, TIME, Jan. 27, 2003, at A20 (describing “boosting pension 
benefits by giving credit” for additional service time as the “latest wrinkle in CEO pay”); 
Joanne S. Lublin, ITT Executives Get Severance – And Jobs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 1998, at H1 
(noting that $165 million was earmarked for executive severance and pension benefits in the 
event of a change of control); Gretchen Morgenson, Jackpot du Jour: It Pays to Quit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at 1 (describing substantial executive pay in the form of pension, long-
term incentive, and change-of-control arrangements); Evan Perez, Delta Holders Approve Plan 
on Executive Pension Accounts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at B2. 
5 See Geoffrey Colvin, Outraged over CEO Exit Packages? You’re Too Late, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 
2005, at 62 (criticizing Fiorina’s severance arrangements); David S. Hilzenrath, Fannie Mae 
Begins Paying Benefits to Former Executives, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at E2; Jenny Wiggins, 
Fund Files Suit Over Fannie Mae Executive Pay-Offs, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2005, at 20; see also Eric 
Dash, The New Executive Bonanza: Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2005 § 3 (Magazine), at 1 
(discussing, among other examples, the costs of generous pensions provided to the CEOs of 
Exxon Mobil, Pfizer, and UnitedHealth Group). 
6 The only other attempt to study systematically executive pensions of which we are aware is 
in Rangarajan K.  Sundaram and David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role 
in Managerial Compensation, Working Paper No. 05-08, New York University, May 2005. A 
main focus of the Sudaram-Yermack study is on the possibility that pensions serve the 
beneficial role of aligning the interests of executives with those of debtholders, an issue 
which we discuss in Part III below.     3
and financial analysis, and standard databases therefore do not include 
compensation paid through pension plans. This omission would not lead to 
significant distortions in analysis of executive pay if (i) pension plan values were not 
significant relative to total executive pay or (ii) pension plan values did not vary 
significantly among executives. In this paper, we examine whether these 
assumptions are valid — and, thus, whether the exclusion of pension values from 
analyses of executive compensation has undermined our understanding of the 
magnitude and nature of executive pay.  
  To do so, the paper provides evidence about the magnitude and variance of 
executives’ pension plan benefits. We study a sample composed of (1) CEOs of S&P 
500 companies who left their position during 2003 and the first five months of 2004 
and (2) current CEOs that are at or close to the retirement age at which they will 
become entitled to a full pension benefit. We find that pension plan values are on 
average quite substantial; that these values vary considerably among the executives 
in our sample; and that omitting them introduces significant inaccuracies in 
assessments of the magnitude and performance sensitivity of executive pay overall.  
  Events of recent years have increased the attention given to executive 
compensation by investors and the media, and it has been suggested that this 
additional scrutiny may provide a check on pay levels and ensure that executive 
compensation is related to firm performance.7 As long as investors, researchers, and 
the media do not have a complete and accurate picture of the magnitude and 
makeup of pay, however, their ability to evaluate pay arrangements will necessarily 
be limited. We seek in this paper both to highlight the inaccuracy of existing 
assessments and to make an empirical contribution to improving them.  
  Our findings indicate that the opaqueness of pension values leads to 
substantial distortions of the picture that investors have of the magnitude and 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Fat Cats Turn to Low Fat: CEO Pay, THE  ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2005 (noting 
“encouraging aspects” among results from a recent survey in CEO pay); Adrian Michaels, 
Off the Leash: What Will Bring Executive Pay Under Control?, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at 15 
(noting that most examples of excessive CEO pay come from the “pre-reform era”).   4
makeup of total pay. We therefore examine what additional disclosure requirements 
could enable investors to get a better picture of the role of pensions in executive 
compensation. Investors would obtain such a picture if firms were required to 
disclose annually (1) the monetary value of each executive’s pension entitlement and 
(2) the year-over-year increase in the value of this benefit based upon the executive’s 
additional service and any increases in the executive’s compensation. In addition, the 
effect of pensions on total pay would become more transparent if firms were to 
include the annual increase in the value of pension benefits in the summary 
compensation tables that most analysts use in assessing the magnitude of executive 
pay across firms.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part II describes the 
current disclosure rules that enable firms to provide compensation via pension 
benefits that is less transparent than other forms of executive pay. Part III discusses 
the difficulty of explaining the heavy use of executive pensions as an efficient 
compensation device. Part IV discusses in detail several examples of CEO pension 
packages to illustrate the potential significance of pension compensation in assessing 
executives’ total pay. Part V provides evidence about the magnitude of pension 
benefits both in absolute terms and relative to other forms of compensation. Part VI 
considers the effects of pension benefits on the link between executive pay and 
performance. Part VII discusses the policy implications of our analysis and the 
disclosure requirements that could, at minimal cost, improve information available to 
investors about the magnitude and effects of pension benefits. Part VIII concludes. 
 
II. THE NON-TRANSPARENCY OF PENSION PAY 
  
Pension plans are an important feature of contemporary executive 
compensation.8 The amounts of the annual payments available under these plans are 
usually based on the number of years an executive has served with the company and 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of pension practices and disclosures provided in BEBCHUK & 
FRIED, supra note 3, ch. 9.    5
the executive’s pre-retirement cash compensation. In general, then, as an executive’s 
salary and tenure increase, the executive’s annual pension benefits increase 
correspondingly. Pension payments, like salary, are largely decoupled from firm 
performance.9  
In their annual proxy filings, firms must publish a summary compensation 
table providing the dollar value of the various forms of compensation received by the 
current CEO and the four other highest-paid executives of the firm. These figures are 
the most salient indicators of executive compensation in public firms. They are easily 
accessible to the media, shareholders, and researchers. As a result, the standard 
databases of executive compensation — including the ExecuComp database, which is 
used both by financial economists and compensation consultants to assess executive 
pay systematically — are based on the highly-visible figures set forth in these tables. 
If executive pensions were structured as defined-contribution plans — with 
companies contributing a specified amount to accounts that will be made available to 
executives upon their retirements — firms would have to report these contributions 
in their summary compensation tables. But under the defined-benefit approach 
commonly used by public companies, annual increases in the value of an executive’s 
retirement assets are largely hidden from view: firms are not required to include 
these increases in their summary compensation tables. A person examining 
compensation tables alone would therefore be unable to detect the steady buildup in 
the value of an executive’s pension benefits.  
Furthermore, disclosure requirements obligate firms to include only those 
amounts paid to current executives in the summary compensation tables. Because 
most executives are no longer employed by the firm when their pension payments 
begin, payments to these retired executives need not be included in the published 
tables. Thus, the value of an executive’s defined-benefit pension plan never appears 
                                                 
9 In addition, it is not uncommon for firms to credit executives with additional years of 
service at the time of their retirement, ratcheting up the final payout under the plan’s 
formula. In our sample, for instance, such ratcheting up was done on behalf of the CEOs of 
Hercules and Delta.    6
— either when pension payments are promised or when they are delivered — in the 
summary compensation tables from which the media and researchers collect most of 
their information about executive compensation.  
For this reason, executive pension plans have sometimes been marketed to 
corporate compensation committees specifically as a means for increasing 
compensation “off the radar screen of shareholders.”10 According to media reports, 
some directors have voted to adopt such plans only after being reassured that the 
monetary value of the benefits would not have to be stated in the company’s 
disclosures.11 
Although the value of executive pension benefits do not appear in public 
disclosures, the existence of the pension plans and the method for determining the 
amount of annual benefits must be disclosed in the firm’s SEC filings.12 In this paper, 
we use these disclosures to make estimates of the value of pension plans awarded to 
the CEOs in our sample. But such estimates are not accessible to outsiders without 
closely analyzing company disclosures and making a series of actuarial assumptions 
and calculations.  
Because of the limitations of existing disclosure requirements, monetary 
values of executive pension plans have not been included in the standard databases 
used for research on executive compensation by financial economists. The 
ExecuComp dataset, for example, includes only those compensation components on 
which firms place a monetary value in their filings. And, because the media also uses 
standard executive pay datasets, pension plan values have not been included in 
                                                 
10 Liz Pulliam Weston, The Fall of Enron; Despite Recession, Perks for Top Executives Grow; Pay: 
Hidden Benefits Mushroom as Employees’ Retirement Plans Shrink, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at A1 
(quoting Cynthia Richson, director of corporate governance for the State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board). 
11 Glenn Howatt, HealthPartners Ex-CEO Reaped Board’s Favors; Secret Deals Contributed to $5.5 
Million Package, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Jan. 17, 2003, at 1A. According to this 
report, the HealthPartners board adopted a defined-benefit pension plan for the CEO “after 
receiving assurances that the supplemental retirement plan wouldn’t have to be reported to 
the public.” Id.  
12 See, e.g., supra note 2.   7
reports on CEO pay published annually in the financial press.13 To what extent has 
this omission distorted perceptions about the magnitude and makeup of executive 
pay? This is a question that we seek to answer in this paper.  
 
III. THE PUZZLE OF EXECUTIVE PENSIONS 
 
    Another important aspect of executive pensions that should be discussed at the 
outset is that it is far from clear that their heavy use by companies has an efficiency 
rationale – that is, that pensions provide an efficient form of compensating 
executives. For any given amount of total pay that executives receive, boards and 
executives negotiating at arm’s length can be expected to structure pay in an efficient 
way. If an alternative form of compensation could increase the total pie available to 
the contracting parties, they could be made both better off by switching to it.  Thus, it 
is worth reflecting on whether there is a good efficiency explanation for the common 
use of pensions as a significant element of executive pay.  
 
A. Tax Benefits  
 
  To many readers, the use of pensions to compensate executives seems natural and 
straightforward given that firms offer pension plans to many non-executive 
employees. But the pension plans used to compensate non-executive employees are 
designed to capture the benefits from favorable tax treatment of “qualified” pension 
plans. Firms get a current deduction for contributing funds to a qualified plan for 
employees, but employees do not pay income taxes until they retire and start getting 
payouts from the qualified plan. Until the employee retires, the funds invested by the 
firm grow tax-free, with neither the firm nor the employees paying any taxes on the 
appreciation in the value of investments. The qualified plans provided to non-
                                                 
13  See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, 2003 Executive Compensation Report, FORTUNE, May 3, 2004, at 123 
(examining climbing pay of Fortune 500 executives, but excluding pension values); Louis 
Lavelle, Executive Pay, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 106 (same).   8
executive employees provide them with tax benefits without increasing the firm’s tax 
bill.  
Because of the limits on how much money can be placed in a qualified pension 
plan for each employee, however, firms cannot use qualified plans to provide 
executives with pensions that are close or even on a similar order of magnitude as 
the executives’ annual compensation. For this reason, firms provide pensions to 
executive mainly through nonqualified “supplemental” executive retirement plans 
(SERPs). These SERPs do not enjoy a tax subsidy. Rather than avoid taxes on 
investment income, they largely shift such taxes from executives to their firms. 
Whether such a shift reduces or increase the combined tax bill of the executive and 
the firm depends on their respective tax rates and investment opportunities.  
There are reasons to doubt that it is generally efficient to have an executive’s tax 
burden shifted to the company. For one thing, given that the long-term capital-gains 
tax rate paid by individuals is lower than the marginal corporate tax rate paid by 
profitable companies, such a shift is likely to be inefficient in many companies. More 
importantly, it is telling that firms providing SERPs to executives generally do not 
offer such plans to non-executives employees. If SERPs were tax-efficient, one would 
expect companies to offer their non-executive employees at least the option of getting 
some of their compensation in the form of such nonqualified plans. However, firms 
generally do not offer employees that reach the limits on contributions to qualified 
plans the option to be paid through nonqualified plans; firms simply give 
compensation to employees and let them save whatever part of it they choose rather 
than save it for them in nonqualified plans. This fact suggests that, absent the tax 
subsidy provided to qualified plans, using nonqualified pension plans is commonly 
not a tax-efficient way to compensate employees. Thus, companies’ common practice 
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B. Reduction in Risk-Bearing Costs  
  
 The SERPs offered to executives shift from the executive to the company not only 
the tax liability for investment gains but also the risk of poor investment 
performance. Executives’ pension plans are defined-benefit plans, which guarantee 
fixed payments to the executive for life and thus shift the risk of investment 
performance entirely to the company and its shareholders. No matter how poorly the 
firm’s investments perform, the executive is guaranteed a specified lifelong stream of 
payments. Thus, putting taxes aside, it might be suggested that executives’ pension 
plans produce an efficient reduction in executives’ risk-bearing costs by shifting risk 
from executives to shareholders that are better able to bear such risk.  
    This explanation, however, is put in doubt by the fact that firms have been 
shifting from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution plans in their 
compensation plans for non-executive employees. If defined-benefit plans produce a 
more efficient allocation of risks in contracts between companies and their 
executives, one would expect them to allocate risks efficiently also in contracts 
between companies and their non-executive employees. Indeed, if anything, one 
would expect defined-benefit plans to be more valuable to regular employees—and 
thus to produce a greater reduction in risk-bearing costs—than they are to 
executives. Relative to executives, non-executive employees are likely to be more 
dependent on their company’s retirement plans to meet their financial needs in 
retirement and therefore less able to bear the investment risks associated with 
defined-contribution plans. Thus, the fact that many companies offer defined-benefit 
plans to their executives but not (or at least no longer) to their regular employees 
casts doubt on the risk-bearing costs explanation.  
 
C. Aligning the Interests of Executives and Debt-holders 
 
    Clearly, providing a substantial part of executives’ compensation through 
pensions does not provide executives with high-powered incentives to enhance share   10
value. In a recent paper, however, Sundaram and Yermack argue that executive 
pensions can be understood as a mechanism for aligning the interests of executives 
not with shareholders but rather with those of debtholders.14 According to this 
explanation, by providing executives with compensation in the form of a debt of the 
firm, firms induce executives to behave more conservatively and discourage them 
from taking risk-increasing actions that could increase the likelihood of default.  
  There are several questions that arise, however, as to whether this debt-serving 
logic can explain companies’ heavy use of executive pensions. First, according to a 
standard view in financial economics, executives are likely to make choices in a more 
conservative fashion than would be in the interest of diversified shareholders, and a 
useful consequence of option plans is that they encourage executives to act less 
conservatively. For those who hold this view, providing executives with debt of the 
company would neutralize some of the effects of option grants and lead executives to 
be too conservative. Second, even if it were desirable to align the interest of 
executives with those of the company’s debtholders, it is unclear why such incentives 
need to be provided through pensions rather than simply by providing executives 
with compensation made of a mix of equity and debt securities of the company (or a 
mix of options on such securities); such compensation could align the interests of 
executives with the firm’s debtholders and shareholders in a more precise way than 
the standard design of pension plans could do.  
  Third, the debt-serving explanation is premised on an assumption that the 
pension obligations that companies create toward their executives face the default 
risk as long-term debt obligations of the company. However, companies often allow 
retiring executives to get in cash the actuarial value of their pension, and companies 
going through chapter 11 reorganizations often assume in full the company’s 
obligation to executives under defined-benefit plans even when they pay only part of 
the claims of financial creditors.15  
                                                 
14 See Sundaram and Yermack, supra note 6. 
15 This statement is based on our conversations with Dave Gordon, a compensation lawyer 
with Clark Consulting with a great deal of experience in this area. In his experience, a   11
  Finally, if executive pensions were designed to serve debtholders, one would 
expect firms to commit to using them in the agreements accompanying the issuance 
of public debt issues, the placement of private debt securities, or the taking of bank 
loans. But such commitments are not commonly included in such agreements.  
 
D. Camouflage  
 
Although the efficiency benefits of providing executives with defined-benefit 
SERPs are far from clear, such plans do have clear “camouflage” consequences. They 
reduce the visibility of a substantial amount of performance-insensitive 
compensation. Thus, to the extent that designers of pay arrangements are interested 
in reducing the salience of the total amount of compensation, or the extent to which 
compensation is decoupled from performance, executive pensions can be useful. A 
camouflage motive might lead to the inclusion of a pension component even when 
such inclusion does not produce efficiency benefits – indeed, even when 






                                                                                                                                                          
substantial fraction of SERPs provide executives with the option of taking the actuarial value 
of their plan as a lump-sum amount upon retirement. When such a lump-sum option is 
available, it is common to use the rate of return on long-term treasury bonds as the discount 
rate used in calculating the actuarial value of the plan at the time of the executive’s 
retirement.   
Also, in Dave Gordon’s experience, it is common for unfunded pension obligations to 
executives to survive chapter 11 bankruptcy. Recent examples of companies that underwent 
chapter 11 reorganizations and assumed fully such obligations are Comdisco and Harvard 
Industries, whose reorganization plans can be found at:  
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IV. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES 
 
  The discussion in the preceding Part highlights the importance of obtaining a 
quantitative sense of the magnitude of executive pensions and the fraction of total 
pay they comprise. Before proceeding to present systematic evidence concerning 
these variables, this Part discusses in detail several examples of large pension 
benefits enjoyed by CEOs. By raising the possibility that executive pensions might be 
a significant form of compensation, these examples motivate and set the stage for the 
more systematic examination conducted in Part V. 
 
A. Pfizer’s $80 Million Pension Benefit  
 
  Dr. Hank McKinnell has served as Pfizer’s CEO since 2001. He is a current 
Chairman of the Business Roundtable and former co-chair of the Business 
Roundtable’s Corporate Governance Task Force. In November 2003, the Business 
Roundtable issued a statement entitled “Principles of Executive Compensation” 
prepared by the Task Force co-chaired by McKinnell.16 According to one of the 
principles companies were urged to follow, “corporations should provide complete, 
accurate, understandable, and timely disclosure to stockholders concerning all 
significant elements of compensation and compensation practices.”17 The principles 
call on companies to disclose compensation in a way that is “transparent and 
understandable to stockholders,” addressing both “the form and amount of executive 
compensation” as well as “the relationship of executive compensation packages to 
corporate goals and strategy.”18  
                                                 
16 B USINESS  ROUNDTABLE,  Executive Compensation: Principles and Commentary, Nov. 2003, 
available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/ExecutiveCompensationPrinciples.pdf 
[hereinafter  Executive Compensation Principles and Commentary]; see also B USINESS 
ROUNDTABLE, Transcript of Telephone Media Briefing, Nov. 17, 2003 (presentation of the 
adopted principles by Hank McKinnell, Franklin Raines, and John Castellani).  
17 Executive Compensation Principles and Commentary, supra note 16, at 2. 
18 Id. at 13-14.   13
  During his tenure as CEO, McKinnell has received total salary of 
approximately $5 million; his total compensation as CEO, at the time of this writing, 
has added up to about $67 million.19 McKinnell’s salary and total compensation as 
CEO do not stand out when compared to CEO pay at peer firms. But these numbers 
tell only half of the compensation story: the value of Dr. McKinnell’s pension plan is 
greater than the total compensation he has received during his years as CEO. 
  At sixty-two, McKinnell is three years away from retirement. Assuming 
conservatively that his compensation will not increase before his retirement — and 
using the pension tables provided in Pfizer’s annual proxy — we estimate that Dr. 
McKinnell will receive an annual pension of $6.5 million upon his retirement.20 It is 
worth noting that Pfizer’s proxy statement discloses neither the actuarial value of Dr. 
McKinnell’s pension benefits nor the amount of the annual payment. To value this 
pension, therefore, a reader would have to carefully review Pfizer’s disclosures to 
determine how the firm will calculate the annual payment — and then make an 
actuarial assessment of the cost of these payments over the remainder of Dr. 
McKinnell’s life. 
Moreover, investors seeking to place a monetary value on Dr. McKinnell’s 
pension plan would require additional information to do so. As is the case with 
many CEOs, his pension will be paid in the form of a joint-life annuity, guaranteeing 
a 50% benefit to his surviving spouse in the event of his death. Thus, the actuarial 
value of his pension plan depends on whether he is married and, if so, the age of his 
                                                 
19 Throughout this paper, we use the term “total compensation” to refer to both equity 
compensation (valued at the grant-date value of options and restricted shares) as well as 
non-equity compensation. We have drawn all of our salary and total compensation figures 
directly from ExecuComp’s database. All compensation from years prior to 2003 has been 
adjusted for inflation using the annual change in the Consumer Price Index. Note that, 
because ExecuComp contains data from 1992 to 2003 only, these results exclude 
compensation received in years outside this period. For additional discussion of our 
methodology for comparing pension values to executives’ total compensation, see infra note 
47. 
20 See Pfizer Inc. Proxy Statement, Mar. 10, 2005, at 55 (annual benefit calculated using the 
company’s pension plan table and assuming that Dr. McKinnell’s 2004 compensation is 
indicative of the total compensation figure upon which his pension benefit will be based).   14
spouse. The proxy statement does not provide any information on these matters. 
According to an article in the press, Mr. McKinnell was engaged to be married,21 but 
we have been unable to identify from public sources whether he has since then 
married his fiancée. The company declined a request that it provide the clarification 
concerning Mr. McKinnell’s marital status necessary to calculate the value of his 
retirement benefit.22  
If Dr. McKinnell is not married, we estimate the actuarial value of his pension 
plan at approximately $71.5 million.23  If he was indeed recently married, the extent 
to which the value of his pension has increased depends on the age of his spouse. For 
example, assuming that Dr. McKinnell’s spouse is the same age as he is, we estimate 
that the marriage has increased the value of his pension by $11.6 million, bringing 
the total amount to about $83 million. In either case, understanding the value of Dr. 
McKinnell’s retirement benefits — which do not appear to be disclosed to investors 
in the “transparent and understandable” way recommended by the Business 
Roundtable — is critical for investors’ gaining a complete picture of his overall 
compensation.  
 
B. UnitedHealth Group: Making CEO Retention More Difficult  
  
Dr. William McGuire became CEO of UnitedHealth Group in October 1999. In 
2003, he earned a base salary of $2.1 million and received total compensation of 
about $10 million.24 Again, however, Dr. McGuire’s annual pay is only part of the 
story.  
Dr. McGuire is entitled to substantial retirement benefits. UnitedHealth will 
pay him about $5.1 million per year upon his retirement for the remainder of his life, 
                                                 
21 See Amy Barrett, Pfizer’s Funk, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 72.  
22 Telephone Interview with Pfizer Media Relations Department, April 8, 2005. 
23 Our methodology for calculating the actuarial value of pension plans is described infra at 
text accompanying notes 41-43.  
24 See UnitedHealth Group Proxy Statement, May 12, 2004, at 18.   15
and it will pay about $2.5 million each year to his surviving spouse.25 Assuming Dr. 
McGuire is married to a woman his age, we estimate the present value of his pension 
benefit at about $45 million, more than four times his total compensation in 2003.  
  An interesting feature of Dr. McGuire’s pension plan is that, once in place, the 
plan’s design might make it more costly for the company to retain him. Companies 
often refer to executive retention as one of the goals of their compensation 
arrangements, but Dr. McGuire’s plan does not seem to serve this goal. Under the 
terms of the plan, the company will be obligated to begin paying Dr. McGuire’s 
annual benefit upon termination of his employment “for any reason.”26 Unlike most 
executives — who must wait until a designated retirement age, usually sixty-five, 
before collecting pension benefits — Dr. McGuire, who is now just fifty-seven years 
old, can begin receiving these substantial payments whenever he chooses to retire.  
  From Dr. McGuire’s perspective, then, working for an additional year costs 
him $5.1 million in forgone pension payments. Thus, UnitedHealth must pay him 
$5.1 million each year in order for him to break even with respect to his decision not 
to retire. That is: Dr. McGuire will be financially rewarded for choosing to work only 
after the company spends $5.1 million to neutralize the effects of McGuire’s 
entitlement to large pension benefits whenever he leaves. 27 
 
C. Black & Decker: The Significance of Pensions to Shareholder Value  
 
While Drs. McGuire and McKinnell are entitled to substantial pension benefits 
in absolute terms, their companies have large market capitalizations, and their 
pension benefits comprise only a small fraction of their firms’ substantial market 
                                                 
25 Id. at 25. 
26 Id. at 25-26. 
27 It might be suggested that, at the time Dr. McGuire was promised his generous retirement 
benefits, the large actuarial value of the plan could have been helpful in inducing him to 
serve as CEO. For any given actuarial benefit the company wanted to provide ex ante, 
however, the company could have avoided the perverse effect described here by providing a 
larger annual payment beginning at a stipulated retirement age — rather than giving Dr. 
McGuire an annual incentive to retire from the firm.   16
value. For smaller companies, however, executives’ pension values might be 
significant relative to overall firm value.  
  Nolan Archibald, Black and Decker’s CEO, will be entitled to annual pension 
payments upon his retirement at age sixty.28 Assuming conservatively that his 
compensation will not go up before his retirement, his annual pension payment will 
be about $2.5 million. We estimate the present value of his retirement benefits at 
$38.3 million.29 
  These pension benefits are hardly negligible to the shareholders’ bottom line. 
At the time of this writing, Black & Decker’s market value stood at approximately 
$6.5 billion.30 Mr. Archibald’s pension alone, then, was worth approximately 0.65% of 
the total value of the firm that he operates. Mr. Archibald’s example makes clear that 
the magnitude of pension benefits can be substantial even in the context of overall 
firm size. 
  Interestingly, as recently as last year, Mr. Archibald’s pension value 
constituted a substantially higher percentage of Black & Decker’s market 
capitalization. This percentage declined between December 2003 and April 2005 as a 
consequence of a recent increase in the price of Black & Decker stock.  As of 
December 31, 2003, Black & Decker’s market capitalization was approximately $3.8 
billion, and the value of Archibald’s pension was therefore equal to about 1% of the 
firm’s market value. Clearly, pension values can be significant relative not only to 
total executive pay but also relative to total firm value.  
 
 
                                                 
28 Black and Decker Corporation Proxy Statement, Mar. 14, 2005, at 14, 16-17. Note that, 
although Black & Decker’s pension plan calls for a retirement age of sixty-five, its 
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan has a “normal retirement age” of sixty. Because the 
majority of Mr. Archibald’s benefits will be paid through the latter program, we used a 
retirement age of sixty in valuing his pension. 
29 For a description of the methodology we used to calculate the actuarial value of pension 
plans, see infra text accompanying notes 41-43.  
30 We calculated the firm’s market capitalization on the basis of outstanding shares and share 
price as of April 1, 2004.   17
D. Home Depot: High Pensions, Brief Tenure 
 
  The preceding examples described executives who had a lengthy tenure with 
their companies. As our final example illustrates, however, some executives are able 
to accumulate rather large retirement benefits even before they accrue lengthy 
service with their firms.   
Robert Nardelli joined Home Depot in December 2000 to become its new 
President and Chief Executive Officer. In 2003, he received total compensation of 
about $22 million.31 Three years into his tenure, however, Mr. Nardelli, who is 56 
years old, is already entitled to annual payments of approximately $3.25 million 
upon his retirement at age sixty-two.32 This figure will go up in the likely event that 
his salary and bonus increase before his retirement. Even assuming that Mr. 
Nardelli’s compensation level remains flat until he is sixty-two, we estimate the 
present value of his pension entitlement upon reaching retirement age at 
approximately $33 million. Thus, if Mr. Nardelli leaves the company upon reaching 
retirement age, he would receive about $4 million in retirement benefits for each year 
of service as CEO.  
Moreover, even if Mr. Nardelli leaves the firm now, he will still be entitled to 
receive annual payments starting at age sixty-two. In such a case, Home Depot’s 
proxy statement indicates, Mr. Nardelli will receive only “discounted benefits,” — 
but the statement provides no information about the size of this discount. In response 
to a request for information about the size of the discount, the company declined to 
provide this information.33 Assuming that the discount is approximately 33%, for 
example, Mr. Nardelli can depart Home Depot after just four years of service with 
retirement benefits of $22 million — or more than $5 million for each year he served 
as CEO. Of course, the exact figure depends on the magnitude of the discount, which 
                                                 
31 The Home Depot, Inc. Proxy Statement, April 12, 2004, at 22. 
32 Id. at 29. We estimated Mr. Nardelli’s annual benefit by applying the company’s formula 
for the benefit to his 2003 compensation.  
33 Telephone Interview with Home Depot Media Relations Department, April 8, 2005.   18
Home Depot has chosen not to disclose to investors — making it even more difficult 
for shareholders to appreciate the significance of these benefits and their effects on 
firm value.  
 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PENSIONS 
 
The above examples suggest that an analysis of executive pay that excludes 
retirement benefits might tell only part of the story. To examine whether this is 
indeed the case, we turn now to a more systematic study of the magnitude of these 




The precise value of an executive’s pension plan usually does not crystallize 
until the executive approaches retirement. Executives who will remain at their firms 
for extended additional periods may well experience changes — usually increases — 
in the magnitude of their annual pension amount. Therefore, to get a good sense of 
the role that pension values play in the overall picture of executive pay, it is useful to 
focus on executives whose final retirement benefits can be estimated with relative 
accuracy. Therefore, our sample includes executives who either have already 
departed their firms or who are likely to retire in the relatively near term.  
Our study therefore includes two sets of executives. Our first sample was 
generated by searching ExecuComp’s database for issuers with CEOs that departed 
their companies during 2003 and the first five months of 2004.34 The second sample 
included all CEOs in the ExecuComp database at S&P 500 companies who are 
between sixty-three and sixty-seven years of age.35  
                                                 
34 We selected this timeframe because ExecuComp’s most recent update at the time of this 
writing included only data available through May of 2004. 
35 Because we drew data on the executives’ ages from the ExecuComp database, our second 
sample consists of CEOs between the ages of sixty-three and sixty-seven at the end of 2003. 
This is the most recent data on executives’ ages available from the database.   19
Our first sample of retired executives is set forth in Table 1 below. Among this 
first group of executives, twenty-eight, or 68%, were members of a company-
sponsored pension plan. Thus, the incidence of pension plans in our sample is 
comparable to some recent estimates of the prevalence of such plans among CEOs of 
public firms in general.36 The CEOs in our first sample were, on average, 
approximately sixty-two years old and served an average term of seven years as CEO 
prior to their departure. Because the group contains only S&P 500 issuers, the mean 
market capitalization of the companies in our sample is rather large, at more than $21 
billion—although the sample includes a relatively diverse collection of companies, 
with values ranging from just over $1 billion to more than $250 billion.37 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
  Our second sample of executives is set forth in Table 2 below. The ExecuComp 
database included thirty-six CEOs of S&P 500 companies between the ages of sixty-
three and sixty-seven. Among our second group of executives, twenty-three, or 64%, 
were members of a company-sponsored pension plan.38 Unsurprisingly, the CEOs in 
our second sample have a slightly higher average age (64.6 years) than the executives 
in our first sample. The issuers in our second sample also have a slightly higher mean 
market value of $26.1 billion —although this sample, too, consists of a broad range of 
companies, with values ranging from $3.5 billion to $271 billion. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
                                                 
36 Clark Consulting estimated that approximately 70% of companies used defined-benefit 
pension plans in 2003. See Clark Consulting, Executive Benefits: A Survey of Current Trends: 
2003 Results,  at http://www.clarkconsulting.com/knowledgecenter/articles/benefits/ 
10thannualsurvey.doc (last accessed Mar. 14, 2005). 
37 Because we have drawn market value data from the ExecuComp database for this group of 
executives, note that all values represent the issuers’ market values at the end of 2003. 
38 The incidence of pension plans in this sample, then, was also consistent with analysts’ 
estimates of the incidence of pension plans. See Clark Consulting, supra note 36.   20
  Taken together, these samples provide a picture of the approximate 
magnitude of the expected costs that executive pension plans impose upon 
shareholders. The first sample, which consists only of retired CEOs, permits us to 
estimate the magnitudes of pensions that shareholders have already begun to pay. 
The second sample, which consists of CEOs that are approaching retirement, permits 
us to assess the approximate costs of pensions that shareholders can be expected to 
start paying before too long.  
 
B. Annual Pension Values 
 
After identifying the set of executives and issuers in each sample, we 
estimated the annual pension benefit of each executive by reviewing the issuers’ 
proxy materials, 8-Ks, and the executives’ employment agreements. These materials 
often disclose either the executives’ annual benefits — which are commonly based 
upon their length of service and selected categories of compensation during the 
executive’s tenure — or at least the way in which the firm calculates this benefit.39 
We also adjusted the annual value of the executives’ pension benefits for “grossing-
up” provisions that entitle participants to have the company cover the tax liability 
generated by pension benefits.40 Our estimates of the annual payments also included 
additional grants of “service credit” by the issuers’ board, which in several cases 
increased the executives’ retirement benefits considerably. For example, in our first 
sample William H. Joyce was granted 15 years’ service credit when he became CEO 
of Hercules, Inc., at an anticipated cost of nearly $5 million.  
                                                 
39 In those cases in which the exact amount of the executive’s annual benefit was not 
disclosed, we assumed that the benefit would be calculated on the basis of the executive’s 
compensation in the year of service preceding his retirement. In all of these cases, we 
calculated the executive’s annual benefit based upon the categories of compensation that the 
issuer’s pension plan includes when calculating benefits. 
40 In those cases that required “grossing up” of annual benefits, we conservatively assumed 
that federal and state income taxes combined subject retiring CEOs to a marginal tax rate of 
35%.   21
Tables 3 and 4 below set forth the CEOs’ annual pension benefits in each of the 
two samples we examine. As Table 3 indicates, the average annual payments for our 
sample of retired executives is about $1.1 million; Charles Cawley, former CEO of 
MBNA Corporation, is entitled to the highest annual pension payment in this group 
at more than $2.3 million per year. Table 4 provides our results for the sample of 
current executives approaching retirement age. These executives had an average 
annual pension benefit of more than $1.5 million. The executive with the highest 
annual pension among our sample of current CEOs, Lee Raymond of Exxon Mobil, is 
entitled to more than $5.7 million per year in benefits. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
C. Costs of Retirement Benefits: Actuarial Values of Pension Plans 
 
After identifying each executive’s annual pension benefit, we calculated the 
value of these income streams by estimating the price of a life annuity instrument41 
purchased at the applicable retirement age and providing an annual payment equal 
to the executive’s benefit.42 In those cases in which the company’s pension plan 
provided benefits to the executive’s spouse on a joint survivor basis, we calculated 
                                                 
41 We did not deduct some small offsets from annual benefits required in some cases in our 
sample for simplicity of calculation and because we did not expect these offsets to be 
significant. Several of the pension plans in our sample require deductions for Social Security 
payments to which the executives will be entitled during their retirement. These benefits are 
likely to be quite small relative to annual pension payments.  
42 These calculations, which depended in part on the executive’s gender and state of 
residence, were in many cases performed by using an Internet mechanism for providing 
annuity values. See  Instant Annuity Price Calculator, at 
http://www.immediateannuities.com (last accessed April 14, 2005). For simplicity, we 
assumed that executives would reside or retire in the state in which the firm maintains its 
headquarters according to ExecuComp.   22
the value of the pension by pricing an annuity providing for joint survivor benefits 
purchased when the executive reached retirement age.43 
All but one member of our first sample are entitled to pension benefits at the 
age of sixty-five.44 Because most of the executives in this first sample will not be 
entitled to receive the annual benefit until they reach the age of sixty-five, we 
discounted the value of their pension benefits to present-value dollars over the time 
period between their departure and the year the executive will reach the retirement 
age.45  
                                                 
43 We used this methodology to calculate the value of the pension benefit in every case but 
one. In that case, Richard Bravman, former CEO of Symbol Technologies, was awarded a 15-
year stream of payments rather than a life benefit. To estimate the value of that benefit, we 
simply calculated the value of a 15-year annuity in the amount of Mr. Bravman’s benefit at a 
discount rate of 5%. 
44 In most cases, the issuer’s proxy materials explicitly indicated that executives would not be 
entitled to pension benefits until they reached the pension plan’s normal retirement age. In 
one case, however, Motorola CEO Christopher Galvin’s pension plan called for payments 
beginning at the age of fifty-five, or shortly after his retirement. Payments in advance of the 
standard retirement age were also used in the much-publicized case of Franklin Raines, 
which was not included in our analysis because Raines’s resignation took place outside our 
sample timeframe. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1. Of course, because such arrangements 
significantly increase the number of actuarially likely payments in the pensioner’s income 
stream, they can increase the value of the pension asset substantially. 
45    In calculating the present value of the pension of CEOs younger than the age in 
which they become entitled to get an annual benefit, we assumed that the executive’s benefit 
will not increase between his departure and age sixty-five. This is a conservative assumption 
because several executives in our sample continued to accrue service-time credit increasing 
the value of their pensions by serving as an outside consultant to the company or as a 
member of the company’s board of directors. For example, G. Thomas Baker of International 
Game Technology became Chairman of that company’s board after his resignation. Richard 
Bravman of Symbol Technologies remained a senior advisor to that company’s new CEO at 
the time of his retirement. Although we expect that both executives would continue to accrue 
service credit as a result of their continued employment, we have not increased their annual 
pension benefit as a consequence of these arrangements.  
In calculating present values, we assumed a discount rate of 5%. Sundaram and 
Yermack, supra note 6, at 7, suggest that the discount rate we used might be lower than the 
one that should be used for companies with a significant likelihood of default. However, 
Some firms have established trusts to ensure that executive pensions will be secure even in 
the event that the firm declares bankruptcy. See, e.g., Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Guess 
Whose Retirement Benefits Aren’t Endangered?; Many Companies Set Up Trusts to Protect Huge   23
Tables 3 and 4 above set forth the actuarial values of the pension benefits of 
the CEOs in our samples. CEO pension values in our first sample, which includes 
only retired executives, had an average value of about $15 million; pension benefits 
for all twenty-eight executives in this sample totaled more than $423 million.46 The 
current CEOs featured in our second sample were, on average, entitled to even more 
generous benefits As Table 4 shows, the average actuarial value of the current 
executives’ pension benefits exceeded $19 million. The twenty-three executives in 
this group were entitled to approximately $451 million in total benefits. Taken 
together, then, our sample of fifty-one current and retired CEOs are entitled to 
pension benefits worth over $800 million. 
Table 5 below provides summary statistics for each of our samples as well as 
summary data for the combined sample of fifty-one executives. The median actuarial 
value of the pension benefits in our first sample was about $14 million; the median 
for our second sample, as well as for the fifty-one executives in our sample overall, 
was approximately $15 million. (In discussing the summary statistics in this and 
subsequent tables, we will focus on median figures in order to avoid distortions 
caused by outliers in the sample.)  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
Pensions for Top Executives, WALL ST. J., April 6, 2003, at B1. Furthermore, as discussed in 
supra note 15, even when executives’ pensions are unsecured, firms going through chapter 11 
bankruptcy often choose to assume fully such obligations. Given these considerations, and 
our assumption that the annual benefit is not expected to rise between the date of calculation 
and the date of eligibility for annual payments, there is little basis for expecting our 
methodology to result in estimates of the present value of executives’ pensions that are 
overall too high rather than too low.  
46 In one case, Joseph Magliochetti of Dana Corporation, after the executive’s death his 
spouse chose a lump-sum payment equal to the present value of the annual benefit to which 
Mr. Magliochetti was entitled. To calculate the comparable annual benefit in this situation, 
we simply calculated the future value of the lump sum payment in this case and then 
computed the actuarially necessary annual payments required to finance an annuity with 
this value. This approach is simply the converse of the analysis we used to calculate the total 
actuarial value of a stream of payments in cases in which the issuer disclosed the value of 
each payment in the stream rather than the value of the lump sum. See text accompanying 
supra notes 41-43.   24
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Importantly, there is substantial variance within each sample and across the 
combined set of fifty-one executives as a whole. As Table 5 shows, the annual 
pension amount ranges from a low of $360 thousand to a high of nearly $2.3 million 
in our first sample of retired CEOs and ranges from a low of about $380 thousand to 
a high of nearly $5.8 million in our second sample of currently serving executives 
nearing retirement age. This substantial variation among executives with pension 
plans indicates that the exclusion of pensions from analysis of executive 
compensation is likely not only to skew analysis of the magnitude of executive pay 
but also distort comparisons among executives. Because the effect of pension 
payments on executives’ compensation varies considerably among individual CEOs, 
analyses of executive pay that omit pension values are likely to produce comparisons 
among executives that do not reflect an accurate ranking of the executives’ total 
compensation. 
 
D. Relative Significance of Pension Values 
  
Having observed the value of pension benefits in each of our samples in 
absolute terms, we turn now to examining how significant these values are in the 
context of executives’ overall pay. Table 6 below presents a comparison between the 
pension benefits we valued and other components of executive compensation in each 
sample and for the combined group of fifty-one executives in our study. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
(1) Ratio of Pension Values to Salaries Received During CEO Tenure: The first 
column in Table 6 compares the executives’ pension values to the base salary the   25
executives received throughout their tenure as CEO.47 The median ratio of 
executives’ pension value to base salary received during their tenure as CEO was 
2.2x for the first sample of retired executives; 1.9x for the second sample of current 
executives; and 2.1x for the overall group of fifty-one executives in our study.  
In addition, the variation of the relationship of the CEOs’ pensions to their 
salaries was substantial within each of the samples and in the group as a whole. This 
ratio ranged from 0.6x to 9.2x in the first sample, and from 0.4xto 16.0x in the second 
sample. The executive with the highest ratio of pension value to CEO salary was 
Robert Catell of Keyspan Corporation, whose pension is worth more than 16.0x the 
total salary payments he has received as CEO. 
(2) Ratio of Pensions to Salaries Throughout Tenure with the Firm: Because some of 
the CEOs in each sample served with their companies prior to their appointment as 
CEO, the second column in Table 6 provides our results for the ratio between the 
executive’s pension value and the salary he received during his entire tenure at the 
company to date. The median ratio between executives’ pension value and salary 
during the executives’ careers with their firms was approximately 1.6x in each of our 
samples, and the median ratio was also 1.6x for the entire group of fifty-one 
executives. Again, there was significant variance within each of the samples. The 
ratio of pension value to total career salary ranged from 0.5x to 5.1x in our first 
sample, and from 0.4x to 5.4x in our second sample. After Robert Catell, who again 
had the highest ratio, the CEO with the second-highest ratio was Maury Myers, CEO 
of Waste Management, Inc., whose pension is worth more than 5.1x the total salary 
he has received during his career at the firm. 
            (3) Ratio of Pensions to Non-Equity Compensation During CEO Tenure:  The  third 
column in Table 6 focuses on the ratio of executives’ pension value to the non-equity 
                                                 
47 We calculated the executives’ total base salary during their service as CEO using 
ExecuComp’s base salary data for each executive between 1992 and 2003, and using the 
database’s “CEO” field to determine whether the executive was CEO during a particular 
year. These ratios therefore exclude compensation the executives received before 1992. Each 
executive’s compensation was adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
estimate of the annual growth in the Consumer Products Index between 1992 and 2003.   26
compensation the executives received during their tenure as CEO.48 The median 
value of this ratio was 0.8x for our first sample of retired executives, 0.7x for our 
second sample of current CEOs, and 0.8x for our group of executives as a whole. 
There was, again, significant variance among executives: the ratio ranged from 0.1x 
to 3.4x in our first sample, and from 0.2x to 7.2x in our second sample.  
(4) Ratio of Pensions to Non-Equity Compensation Throughout Firm Tenure: The 
fourth column of Table 6 also compares pension values to non-equity compensation, 
but includes non-equity compensation received throughout the executives’ tenure 
with their firms — regardless whether the compensation was received during the 
executives’ service as CEO or in another executive position. Even when we include 
this compensation in our comparison between pension values and non-equity pay,  
pensions remain a significant factor. The median ratio between CEO pension values 
and non-equity compensation received throughout the executives’ tenure with their 
firms was approximately 0.6x for both of our samples of executives as well as for the 
group in our study overall.  
In addition, there was considerable variance in the relationship between 
various executives’ pensions and their non-equity compensation; among all 
executives with pensions in our data set, this ratio ranged from 0.1x to 2.9x. Mr. 
Catell was again the leader among all fifty-one executives in our group with a ratio of 
approximately 2.9x between his pension and his total non-equity compensation; 
Kevin Dunnigan, CEO of Thomas & Betts, was close behind with a ratio of 
approximately 2.4x. 
                                                 
48 We calculated the executives’ non-equity compensation during their tenure as CEO using 
ExecuComp’s data for the executive’s total compensation including the value of options at 
the date they were granted and reducing that total compensation figure by the Black-Scholes 
value of the options at the date of issuance and the value of any restricted stock grants. In 
one case, to correct for a reporting error in ExecuComp’s database we were required to use 
the executive’s compensation based upon the exercise value, rather than the issuance value, 
of equity compensation. Because exercise value was typically less than issuance value in this 
executive’s case, this too is a conservative assumption. Note also that for our sample of 
currently serving executives, all compensation data includes only results through December 
of 2003, the last complete update of the ExecuComp database.    27
  (5) Ratio of Pensions to Total Executive Compensation: Finally, we compared the 
value of the executives’ pensions to the total compensation — including equity-based 
compensation — that the executives received before their retirement.49 Table 7 below 
presents the results of this analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
The first column of Table 7 compares the value of the executives’ pensions to 
the total compensation they received during their tenure as CEO and expresses the 
value of the pension as a percentage of the executive’s total compensation. The 
median ratio between the executive pensions and total executive compensation in 
our first sample was 35.3%; in our second sample, 27.8%; and in the overall group of 
executives in our study, 34.5%. Table 7 therefore indicates that the executives’ 
pensions represented a considerable proportion of the executives’ total compensation 
during their service as CEO. Table 7 also indicates that there was considerable 
variance among executives with respect to the ratio between executive pensions and 
total compensation. Robert Catell again led all executives in our sample, with a 
pension benefit worth more than 458.0% of the value of the total compensation he 
has received during his tenure as CEO.  
The second column in Table 7 also measures the relationship between 
executive pensions and total compensation, but includes all compensation received 
during the executives’ careers with their companies, including any service prior to 
their appointment as CEO. Even when pre-CEO compensation is included, the 
relationship between pensions and total career compensation remained significant. 
The median ratio between the executives’ pensions and the total compensation they 
received throughout their careers with their companies was 30.7% for our first 
                                                 
49 To calculate the CEO’s total compensation, we used ExecuComp’s total compensation data 
including the value of stock options and restricted stock at the issuance date and adjusted 
each value to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. For a more detailed description 
of our methodology for valuing total executive compensation, see supra notes 47-48.   28
sample of retired executives, 27.7% for our sample of currently serving CEOs, and 
30.2% for all executives included in our study. The ratio ranged from a low of 1.1% to 
a high of 136.6% among all of the executives in our group; Mr. Catell again led all 
CEOs, with Kevin Dunnigan of Thomas & Betts Corporation close behind with 
pension benefits worth 114.7% of the total compensation he has received during his 
career at the firm. 
  Thus, excluding pension benefits from analysis of executive pay leads to 
significant underestimation of the magnitude of executive compensation overall. 
Among the CEOs with pensions in our study, excluding pension values for the 
median executive ignores an element that increases the executive’s pay throughout 
his tenure at the firm by about 30%.  
Second, the significant variance among executives with respect to the 
relationship between pensions and total executive pay indicates that analysis of 
executive compensation that excludes pensions is likely to lead to substantially 
inaccurate comparisons among CEOs. For example, excluding pension values for 
Sanford Weill of Citibank results in underestimating his total compensation during 
his career at the firm by just 1.1%. In contrast, excluding pension values for Robert 
Catell at Keyspan results in underestimating his total compensation while at the firm 
by more than 136.6%.  
Moreover, excluding pension benefits would also distort comparisons 
between those executives that have pensions and the significant number of 
executives that are not entitled to annual pension payments.50 In sum, in any ranking 
of executives’ total compensation, the exclusion of pension values leads to significant 
underestimation of the relative position of executives with substantial pension values 
and overestimation of the relative positions of executives with low pension values or 
no pension plan at all.  
                                                 
50 Note that, among the executives reviewed in our first sample of retired CEOs, 
approximately 32% of executives had no pension benefits of any kind; and, within our 
second sample of currently serving CEOs, approximately 36% of executives had no disclosed 
pension benefits. See supra text accompanying supra notes 35-38.   29
VI. PENSIONS AND THE LINK BETWEEN PAY AND PERFORMANCE 
 
  The value of pension benefits is to a large extent unrelated to the performance 
of the firm during the executive’s tenure. The annual pension amount depends—to a 
significant extent, and sometimes exclusively—on the base salary that the CEO 
received in the years preceding his or her departure. Some benefit formulas are also 
based on bonus compensation, but even in such cases the pension benefit is 
frequently based on the executive’s target bonus rather than the actual bonus paid, 
decoupling the benefit from the executive’s performance. 
Thus, excluding the substantial compensation provided via pensions from 
analysis of executive pay results in a systematic underestimation of the extent to 
which pay is based on salary-like payments—that is, payments of salary during the 
executive’s service as CEO and pension payments afterwards. To get a sense of the 
magnitude of this underestimation, we compared the composition of the executives’ 
pay when their pension values were and were not included in the analysis. The 
results of these comparisons are presented in Table 8 below.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
A. Effect of Pensions on the Proportion of CEOs’ Salary-Like Payments  
 
  As Table 8 shows, including pension values in executives’ total pay greatly 
increases the fraction of total compensation that is paid through salary-like 
payments. Before including pensions, the median CEOs in our first, second, and 
overall samples received 15.6%, 14.7%, and 15.3% of their total compensation while 
CEO in the form of salary-like payments. When we included pensions as an 
additional source of salary-like payments, however, the median ratio between salary-
like payments and total CEO compensation increased to 39.1% for the first sample, 
38.9% for the second sample, and 38.9% for the overall group of CEOs.  
  Importantly, there was also substantial variance among executives with   30
respect to the effect that including pensions had upon the fraction of their total 
compensation paid through salary-like payments. In the case of Glen Barton, former 
CEO of Caterpillar, for example, including pensions increased the fraction of total 
compensation made through salary-like payments from 19.9% to 49.7%. 
Furthermore, as the second column of Table 8 shows, inclusion of pension values 
substantially increased not only the mean and median levels but also the variance 
among executives with respect to the ratio between salary-like payments and total 
compensation.  
 
B. Effect of Pensions on the Proportion of CEOs’ Non-Equity Compensation 
 
  The third and fourth columns in Table 8 display summary statistics for the 
ratio between executives’ non-equity compensation51 and their total compensation 
during their service as CEO.  As the third column of Table 8 indicates, the median 
CEO in our first, second, and overall samples received 42.0%, 49.9%, and 43.9% of 
their pay, respectively, in the form of non-equity compensation when pension 
amounts are excluded. As the fourth column of Table 8 shows, however, these ratios 
increased significantly when we included pensions as a form of non-equity 
compensation. The median ratio between non-equity pay including pensions paid to 
the retired executives in our first sample was 60.4%; in our second sample, 65.2%; 
and, for the group of fifty-one executives in our study, 61.0%. Thus, including 
pensions in non-equity compensation for our entire sample of executives increased 
the median ratio of non-equity compensation to total executive pay from 43.9% to 
61.0%. 
  Again, there was significant variance among executives with respect to the 
extent to which including pensions increased the ratio of non-equity compensation to 
total compensation. In the case of Jim Murdy of Allegheny Technologies, for 
example, including pensions raised this ratio to approximately 90%. 
                                                 
51 For a description of our methodology for assessing non-equity compensation, see infra note 
48.   31
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Investors’ Current Misperceptions 
 
  The evidence presented in the preceding Part indicates that the omission of 
pension values from standard datasets — and, as a result, from the compensation 
figures generally used by financial economists and the media — significantly 
undermines the accuracy of existing estimates of executive pay. There are three 
important ways in which this omission has clouded shareholders’ understanding of 
executive compensation.  
 (i)  Underestimation of Total Executive Pay: It has often been argued that existing 
analysis overestimates the value of executive compensation because the Black-
Scholes approach to option valuation overestimates the value of options to risk-
averse, undiversified executives.52 However, this paper suggests that, for executives 
who benefit from pension plans, existing estimates might underestimate the total 
value that executives obtain from their pay packages. Across our sample of more 
than fifty S&P 500 companies, the value of executives’ pension plans added on 
average more than 48% to total pay during the executive’s service as CEO.  
 (ii)  Distorted Comparisons among Executives: Because pension values are often 
quite substantial, and because their size varies significantly among executives, the 
omission of pension values yields substantial inaccuracies in comparisons of pay 
among executives. Including pension values could significantly alter existing 
rankings of executives in terms of compensation. 
  Similarly, excluding pension values might have distorted the findings of 
research seeking to identify how executive pay is correlated with various 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., Joseph Bachelder, A Comment on Pay Without Performance, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 
2005); Brian Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives 11 (U.S.C. 
Marshall School of Business, Working Paper No. 01-16, 2001); Lisa K. Meulbroek, The 
Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock 
Options, 30 FIN. MGMT. 5, 8 (2001).   32
characteristics of the firm, or its executives and directors.53 Such distortions are 
particularly likely if pension values are not distributed randomly but rather are 
significantly correlated with various attributes of the company and its executives and 
directors. How pension values are related to such attributes is an important question 
that would be worth studying in subsequent research. 
 (iii)  Overestimation of the Pay-Performance Correlation: The omission of pension 
values has also led to overestimation of the extent to which total executive pay is 
correlated with performance.  
First, note that omission of pension values has led to substantial 
misperceptions regarding the magnitude of CEO pay that is salary-like. It is widely 
thought that most executive compensation is linked in some way to performance 
because base salary comprises a relatively small part of total executive 
compensation.54 Across our entire sample, for example, salary comprises on average 
approximately 17% of the total compensation paid to the departing executive during 
his service as CEO. However, once we take into account pension values, the picture 
changes significantly. When pension is included for all of the executives in our 
sample, however, on average 39% of the executive’s total compensation during their 
service as CEO was given in the form of salary-like payments.  
Researchers have often observed that executive compensation has over the 
past decade shifted significantly towards equity-based compensation,55 which is 
regarded as more closely linked to performance than other types of compensation.56 
Once pension value is included in an analysis of the total compensation paid to 
                                                 
53 For a survey of such studies, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3 ch.6.  
54 See, e.g., Adam Bryant, How Companies Make the Boss Buy Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at 
A1. 
55  See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Pay… and How to Pay for It (Draft Mar. 
2005), at 8-10. For an empirical examination of the different rates at which equity-based 
compensation and non-equity compensation grew during the past decade, see Lucian 
Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, (Olin Discussion Paper No. 510, 
April 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=648682. 
56  It is worth noting that, under existing practices, equity-based compensation is less tightly 
linked to performance than is commonly appreciated. See Bebchuk and Fried, supra note 3,  
ch. 11-14.    33
executives, however, equity-based compensation no longer represents the principal 
component of executive pay (although it remains a substantial component of total 
compensation).  For all of the executives in our sample, equity-based compensation 
provides on average only 41% of total compensation when pensions are included 
(compared with 55% of total compensation when pensions are omitted).  
 
B. Can Executive Pensions Become Transparent? 
 
  The omission of pension values from analysis of executive compensation it 
results from the approach that the SEC has taken to executive pay disclosure. 
Because SEC rules do not require firms to disclose a monetary value for the pension 
entitlements provided to executives each year, firms have been able to provide large 
amounts of compensation via pensions away from the glare of full disclosure. 
Because firms are required to provide a monetary value only for current payments — 
as well as compensation in the form of options and share grants — companies have 
not provided information with respect to the monetary value of pension benefits, 
creating the misperceptions we have discussed here.  
  To be sure, the evidence we have provided does not indicate that the firms in 
our study did not disclose information about the monetary values of executives’ 
pensions in order to hide these values from investors. Because firms are not required 
to disclose such information, issuers may simply be pursuing a “lawyerly” approach 
to disclosure, providing only the information that the SEC requires. For our 
purposes, however, it is important to recognize that, as long as issuers are not 
required to disclose the values of executive pensions fully, one cannot rely on firms 
to make such disclosures voluntarily.  
The picture of executive pay that investors have would thus be likely to 
improve if SEC were to require firms to disclose annually the value of pension 
benefits that their CEO and four other highest-paid officers of the firm will be 
entitled to upon their retirement. Under such an approach, firms could be required to 
place a monetary value on both (1) the annual value of the pension benefit and (2) the   34
actuarial value of the pension in view of the executive’s age, marital status, and other 
information relevant to the financial value of the pension. Firms could also be 
required to disclose the value of the pension in the event that the executive chooses 
to retire from the firm in the short term — rather than relying on the ambiguous 
reference to “discounted benefits” that is most firms’ current practice.57 
Furthermore, in addition to disclosing the annual pension amount and the 
actuarial value of the pension plan, firms could also be required to disclose annually 
any change in the value of the pension benefit from the previously reported amount. 
As we have indicated, the annual value of pension benefits typically increases as 
executives accumulate additional salary and tenure at the firm, often leading to 
increases in the actuarial value of executives’ retirement benefits. Investors’ 
recognition of the total value of pay packages would improve if the SEC were to 
require that these increases be reported in the summary compensation tables firms 
must provide in their proxy statements. Because these increases in actuarial plan 
value are functionally similar to other compensation paid by the firm as a result of 
the executive’s work in that year, including these increases in the summary table 
would provide shareholders and researches with a straightforward access to the 
aggregate value of the executive’s total compensation in a given year. 
We do not expect that complying with these additional disclosure 
requirements will impose any meaningful costs on firms.58 Firms generally already 
have, or have low-cost access to, the type of information necessary to value 
retirement benefits — including the executive’s age, the age of his beneficiaries, and 
the annual level of benefits to which the executive is entitled. Firms thus are likely to 
be able to obtain this information at lower cost than can shareholders or 
                                                 
57 For an example of the valuation difficulties caused by an ambiguous reference to 
“discounted” benefits in the event of an early executive departure, see infra text 
accompanying notes 32-34. 
58 For a detailed analysis of the low costs generally associated with mandatory disclosure of 
the type we propose here, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities 
Regulation Around the World, at 8-10 (Olin Discussion Paper No. 492, 2005).    35
researchers.59 
Enhanced transparency of pension pay could significantly improve the 
information available to investors concerning the magnitude and makeup of total 
executive pay. Furthermore, such enhanced transparency would also discourage 
firms from providing executives with large amounts of performance-insensitive 
compensation away from the scrutiny of public disclosure. Boards and compensation 
committees that are concerned about investor and media reactions to an increase in 
total pay levels will no longer be able to increase compensation through pension 
payments without having the additional pay register on investors’ radar screens. 
 Moreover, we expect that, if investors became aware of the value of pension 
plans and the extent to which they increase the fraction of total pay comprised of 
salary-like payments, outside scrutiny would put pressure on firms to link pay and 
firm performance more closely. Our analysis indicates that the exclusion of pensions 
from analysis of executive pay has led shareholders to underestimate not only the 
magnitude of executive compensation but also to overestimate the link between pay 
and firm performance. Thus, enhanced transparency of executives’ pension pay 
might induce firms to shift compensation from salary-like payments — which could 





  In this paper, we have provided empirical evidence regarding magnitude and 
variability of executive pension benefits. Our analysis demonstrates how the 
omission of pension benefits from compensation figures generally used by investors, 
researchers, and the media has led to substantial underestimation of the magnitude 
                                                 
59 For an economic justification of mandatory disclosure grounded in the notion that firms 
are the lowest-cost obtainers of most information relevant to securities valuation, see Paul G. 
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048-
49 (1995).    36
and performance-insensitivity of total executive pay.  
Before closing, we should stress an important reason why our findings might 
systematically underestimate the inaccuracies introduced by the current omission of 
retirement benefits from standard estimates of executive pay. This paper has focused 
on one important type of retirement benefit: defined-benefit pension plans. But 
executives receive other types of retirement benefits that are currently not included 
in the datasets used by researchers and the media to analyze executive pay.  
First, many executives receive substantial post-retirement perks, including 
payments for consulting services that may well represent compensation for services 
rendered before their retirement.60 More importantly, executives may also derive 
large gains from deferred compensation arrangements that enable them to pass the 
tax costs of investment gains to their firms.61 Because firms do not have to disclose 
the amounts invested by executives in such programs, it is difficult for outsiders even 
to estimate — as we have done here for pension benefits — the gains made by 
executives from such plans.   
For these reasons, additional research is needed to examine such benefits more 
closely. Without more information about benefits from deferred compensation 
arrangements, we would not be able to put executives’ retirement benefits fully on 
the radar screen. The analysis presented here, however, provides evidence that 
retirement benefits have a substantial effect on the magnitude and makeup of 
executive pay.  Any work on executive compensation that uses compensation figures 
not including retirement benefits should recognize that it is ignoring a significant 
component of executive pay.  
 
 
                                                 
60 For example, Henry Silverman of Cendant, who does not have a traditional pension 
benefit, is entitled to receive upon his departure from the firm consulting fees of about $1 
million a year for the rest of his life. See Cendant Corporation, 2004 Proxy Statement, March 1, 
2004, at 26.  
61 For a detailed description of deferred compensation arrangements and the costs they 
impose on firms, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, ch. 8.   37
 
Table 1: Departing S&P 500 Executives With Pension Plans 
                  
 Issuer  Name   Market Value    Executive Age    Date  of 
Departure 
  Length of Service 
(Years) 
                  
 Allegheny Technologies Inc  1,066,854,000  Murdy  65  9/30/2003    2.28 
 Ambac Financial Gp    7,414,668,000  Lassiter  60  1/27/2004    12.93 
 Ameren Corp    7,470,446,000  Mueller  65  12/31/2003    10.14 
 Anadarko Petroleum Corp  12,798,307,000 Allison, Jr.  65  1/1/2002    15.48 
 Bard (C.R.) Inc    4,213,625,000  Longfield  65  8/1/2003    9.30 
 Boeing Co    33,721,102,000 Condit  63  12/1/2003    7.70 
 Caterpillar Inc    28,661,824,000 Barton 65  1/31/2004    5.07 
 Clorox Co/De    9,243,705,000  Sullivan  65  7/1/2003    11.33 
 Citigroup Inc   250,402,188,000 Weill  70  10/1/2003    5.83 
 Coca-Cola Enterprises    9,948,707,000  Kline  64  1/1/2004    2.76 
 Dana Corp    2,727,122,000  Magliochetti 60  9/22/2003    4.69 
 Delta Air Lines Inc    1,458,535,000  Mullin  61  1/1/2004    6.48 
 Duke Energy Corp    18,977,189,000 Priory  57  11/1/2003    6.51 
 Firstenergy Corp    11,462,387,000 Burg  56  12/22/2003    4.72 
 Freeprt Mcmor Cop&Gld  7,226,601,000  Moffett  65  12/1/2003    19.61 
 Hercules Inc    1,352,809,000  Joyce  69  11/25/2003    2.59 
 Intl Paper Co    20,712,932,000 Dillon  66  10/31/2003    7.69 
 Jefferson-Pilot Corp    7,144,436,000  Stonecipher  63  2/29/2004    11.16 
 MBNA Corp    31,750,148,000 Cawley  64  12/30/2003    1.18 
 Moodys Corp    9,009,840,000  Rutherfurd, Jr. 65  10/1/2003    3.04 
 Motorola Inc    33,500,770,000 Galvin  54  1/5/2004    7.11 
 New York Times Co   7,118,277,000  Lewis  56  12/31/2004    7.31 
 Progress Energy Inc    11,091,642,000 Cavanaugh III 65  2/29/2004    7.52 
 Rockwell Automation    4,851,026,000  Davis, Jr.  65  2/4/2004    6.44 
 Symbol Technologies    3,905,069,000  Bravman  47  12/30/2003    1.43 
 Texas Instruments Inc    50,845,762,000 Engibous  51  5/1/2004    7.98 
 Thomas & Betts Corp    1,338,287,000  Dunnigan  66  1/16/2004    3.49 
 Waste Management Inc  17,240,904,000 Myers  63  3/1/2004    4.37 
                
        Mean Values    21,666,255,786   62      7.00 
        Median Values    9,126,772,500    65      6.49   38
 
Table 2: Currently Serving S&P 500 CEOs Between Ages 63 and 67 
 
 
Issuer Name    Market Value   Executive   Age Date  Became 
CEO 
Length of Service 
(Years) 
                      
  Aon Corp    7,507,775,000    Ryan    66    8/1/82    23.0 
  Avery Dennison Corp    6,188,529,000    Neal    63    5/1/98    7.0 
  Colgate-Palmolive Co    26,888,861,000    Mark    65    5/1/84    21.2 













  Dow Chemical    38,266,641,000    Stavropoulos    64    12/15/02    2.4 
  Exxon Mobil Corp    271,001,813,000   Raymond    65    4/28/93    12.1 
  Gannett Co    24,167,889,000    McCorkindale   64    6/1/00    4.9 
  Genuine Parts Co    5,775,738,000    Prince    65    4/1/89    16.3 
  Harley-Davidson Inc    14,400,212,000    Bleustein    64    6/1/97    8.0 
  Keyspan Corp    5,853,408,000    Catell    67    5/1/98    7.0 
  Knight-Ridder Inc    6,181,554,000    Ridder    63    3/24/95    10.2 
  Masco Corp    12,694,996,000    Manoogian    67    1/1/85    20.6 
  Merck & Co    102,794,859,000   Gilmartin    63    6/16/94    11.0 
  Nisource Inc    6,069,212,000    Neale    64    3/1/93    12.3 
  Norfolk Southern Corp    9,233,409,000    Goode    63    9/1/92    12.8 
  Scientific-Atlanta Inc    3,551,945,000    McDonald    63    7/15/93    11.9 
  Sempra Energy    6,800,654,000    Baum    63    6/1/00    4.9 
  Southtrust Corp    10,863,623,000    Malone, Jr.    67         
  Teradyne Inc    4,869,603,000    Chamillard    65    5/16/97    8.0 
  Txu Corp    7,682,671,000    Nye    66    5/1/95    10.1 
  Unisys Corp    4,906,692,000    Weinbach    64    9/23/97    7.7 
  Valero Energy Corp    5,573,219,000    Greehey    67    1/1/97    8.4 
                     
        Mean Values    26,115,594,348      64.6      10.8 
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Table 3: The Value of Retired CEOs’ Pension Plans 
    
                    
   Issuer  Name   Executive   Annual  Pension  Actuarial Value of Pension   
                  
   Allegheny Technologies Inc  Murdy  818,983 10,433,234    
   Ambac Financial Gp    Lassiter  1,950,000 19,463,885    
   Ameren  Corp    Mueller  360,000 4,586,104    
   Anadarko Petroleum Corp  Allison, Jr.  1,634,200 20,818,314    
   Bard (C.R.) Inc    Longfield  1,174,428 18,075,353    
   Boeing  Co   Condit  1,419,600 16,403,208    
  Caterpillar Inc    Barton  1,312,500 16,720,171
  Clorox Co/De    Sullivan  1,760,000 22,960,578
  Citigroup Inc    Weill  1,061,226 11,838,822
  Coca-Cola Enterprises    Kline  480,000 5,823,624
  Dana Corp    Magliochetti  1,132,488 11,303,863
  Delta Air Lines Inc    Mullin  480,000 6,751,188
  Duke Energy Corp    Priory  544,552 4,695,298
  Firstenergy Corp    Burg  558,055 8,663,537
  Freeprt Mcmor Cop & Gld  Moffett  1,400,000 25,234,900
  Hercules Inc    Joyce  477,390 5,470,710
  Intl Paper Co    Dillon  1,489,554 18,365,143
  Jefferson-Pilot Corp    Stonecipher  2,272,143 26,254,146
  MBNA Corp    Cawley  2,274,000 27,589,420
  Moodys Corp   Rutherfurd, Jr. 950,000 12,102,270
  Motorola Inc    Galvin  1,507,692 41,283,263
  New York Times Co   Lewis  750,000 6,158,841
  Progress Energy Inc   Cavanaugh III 1,045,168 13,314,530
  Rockwell Automation    Davis, Jr.  1,165,879 15,002,428
  Symbol Technologies    Bravman  600,000 3,302,733
  Texas Instruments Inc    Engibous  742,306 4,776,122
  Thomas & Betts Corp    Dunnigan  1,807,500 26,185,101
  Waste Management Inc  Myers  923,077 19,808,226
        
      Mean Values      1,146,098 15,120,893  40
Table 4: The Value of Current CEOs’ Pension Plans 
 
 
Issuer Name    Executive       Annual    
    Pension 
  Actuarial Value of    
           Pension 
  Aon Corp    Ryan    379,611   4,835,932     
  Avery Dennison Corp    Neal    1,047,387   13,663,952  
  Colgate-Palmolive Co    Mark    2,160,000   35,759,000  
  Cooper Industries Ltd    Riley, Jr.    1,066,000   13,579,913  
  Countrywide Financial Corp    Mozilo    2,171,358   22,537,954  
  Dow Chemical    Stavropoulos    1,457,000        18,561,033  
  Exxon Mobil Corp    Raymond    5,760,000   73,377,666  
  Gannett Co    McCorkindale    2,140,000        27,261,841 
  Genuine Parts Co    Prince    925,040   11,784,249 
  Harley-Davidson Inc    Bleustein    1,750,000   22,757,959 
  Keyspan Corp    Catell    1,248,750   15,035,833 
  Knight-Ridder Inc    Ridder    793,743   10,354,936 
  Masco Corp    Manoogian    508,057    6,117,324 
  Merck & Co    Gilmartin    1,568,000   19,975,082 
  Nisource Inc    Neale    483,000     6,153,023 
  Norfolk Southern Corp    Goode    1,231,737   15,691,355 
  Scientific-Atlanta Inc    McDonald    1,123,101   14,307,422 
  Sempra Energy    Baum    836,288   13,520,536 
  Southtrust Corp    Malone, Jr.    3,765,115   45,334,489 
  Teradyne Inc    Chamillard  513,400     6,540,243  
  Txu Corp    Nye 1,995,511    24,603,196   
  Unisys Corp    Weinbach  1,000,000         13,004,256  
  Valero Energy Corp    Greehey       1,354,000    16,302,991  
        
        Mean Values         1,533,787    19,611,312    41
Table 5: Magnitude and Variability of Pension Values 
 
 
Sample Statistics    Annual Pension 
Amounts 
  Actuarial Value of Pension 
  
Retired CEOs (28)   
     Median    1,096,857 14,158,479 
     Mean    1,146,098 15,120,893 
     Standard Deviation       549,307    9,117,543 
     Minimum      360,000    3,302,733 
     Maximum    2,274,000 41,283,263 
   
Current CEOs (23)   
     Median    1,231,737 15,035,833 
     Mean    1,533,787 19,611,312 
     Standard Deviation    1,193,181 15,141,154 
     Minimum       379,611     4,835,932 
     Maximum    5,760,000   73,377,666 
   
Combined Sample (51)   
     Median    1,132,488   15,002,428 
     Mean    1,320,938   17,145,984 
     Standard Deviation       909,569   12,282,278 
     Minimum       360,000     3,302,733 
     Maximum    5,760,000 73,377,666 
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1 "CEO Career Salary" refers to the executive's base salary as reported by ExecuComp between 1992 and 2003 for all  
   years in which the executive served as CEO, adjusted according to the annual CPI provided by the Bureau of Labor  
   Statistics. 
2 "Career Salary" refers to the executive's total base salary as reported by ExecuComp between 1992 and 2003,  
   regardless whether the executive was serving as CEO. 
3 "CEO Career Non-Equity" refers to the executive's total compensation including options at issuance value as  
   reported by ExecuComp between 1992 and 2003 for all years in which the executive served as CEO, less restricted  
   stock and option grants, adjusted according to the annual CPI.
  
4 "Career Non-Equity" refers to the executive's total compensation including options at issuance value as reported by  
   ExecuComp between 1992 and 2003, regardless whether the executive served as CEO, less restricted stock and  
   option grants as reported by ExecuComp in each year. 












               
Retired CEOs (28)                 
     Median  2.2   1.6   0.8   0.6  
     Mean  2.8   1.9   1.1   0.8  
     Standard Deviation  1.9   1.1   0.9   0.6  
     Minimum  0.6   0.5   0.1   0.1  
     Maximum  9.2   5.1   3.4   2.4  
               
Current CEOs (23)                 
     Median  1.9   1.6   0.7   0.6  
     Mean  2.8   1.9   1.1   0.7  
     Standard Deviation  3.1   1.1   1.4   0.5  
     Minimum  0.4   0.4   0.2   0.2  
     Maximum  16.0   5.4   7.2   2.9  
               
Combined Sample (51)                 
     Median  2.1   1.6   0.8   0.6  
     Mean  2.8   1.9   1.1   0.7  
     Standard Deviation  2.5   1.1   1.1   0.6  
     Minimum  0.4   0.4   0.1   0.1  
     Maximum  16.0   5.4   7.2   2.9    43
Table 7: Significance Relative to Total Compensation 
 
 
Sample Statistics    Pension/CEO Career 
Total Comp.
1 
 Pension/Career  Total 
Comp.
2 
          
  Retired CEOs (28)       
       Median    35.3% 30.7% 
       Mean    44.4% 32.9% 
       Standard Deviation    33.4% 22.5% 
       Minimum      1.6%    1.1% 
       Maximum    139.9% 114.7% 
       
  Current CEOs (23)     
       Median      27.8%  27.7% 
       Mean      53.0%  35.0% 
       Standard Deviation      91.0%  29.2% 
       Minimum        5.8%    5.4% 
       Maximum    458.0% 136.6% 
       
  Combined Sample (51)     
       Median     34.5%     30.2% 
       Mean     48.3%     33.8% 
       Standard Deviation     65.3%     25.5% 
       Minimum       1.6%       1.1% 













1 "CEO Career Total Comp." refers to the executive's total compensation including options at  
    issuance value between 1992 and 2003 during the years of CEO service only. 
2 "Career Total Comp." refers to the executive's total compensation including options at issuance  
    value between 1992 and 2003, regardless whether the executive served as CEO.   44




1 This represents the ratio of base salary received during years of CEO service to the total compensation   
   received during years of CEO service. In this column, total CEO compensation excludes pension values. 
2 This represents the ratio of the present value of base salary received during years of CEO service plus  
   pension payments to total compensation received during years of CEO service plus pension payments. 
3 This represents the ratio of the present value of non-equity compensation received during years of CEO  
   service to total compensation received during years of CEO service. In this column, total CEO  
   compensation excludes pension values. 
4 This represents the ratio of the present value of non-equity compensation received during years of CEO  
  service and pension payments to total compensation received during years of CEO service plus pension  
  payments. 
 
 
Ratio of CEO Salary-like Compensation to Total 
CEO Compensation 
 
Ratios of CEO Non-Equity Compensation to Total 
CEO Compensation 
Issuer Name  CEO Salary/Total  
CEO Comp.
1 
(Pensions not Included) 




CEO Non-Equity Comp.  
/Total CEO Comp.
3  






           
Retired CEOs (28)             
   Median  15.6%  39.1%    42.0%    60.4% 
   Mean  16.2%  38.9%    42.0%    57.2% 
   Standard Deviation  8.6%  15.9%    17.5%    17.7% 
   Minimum  1.4%  3.0%    14.5%    15.8% 
   Maximum  47.0%  69.6%    78.7%    90.8% 
           
Current CEOs (23)             
   Median  14.7%  38.9%    49.9%    65.2% 
   Mean  16.8%  38.2%    48.3%    60.6% 
   Standard Deviation  7.3%  16.2%    17.0%    18.0% 
   Minimum  6.3%  13.3%    18.3%    22.8% 
   Maximum  33.9%  87.2%    82.1%    93.4% 
           
Combined  Sample(51)           
   Median  15.3%  38.9%    43.9%     61.0% 
   Mean  16.5%  38.6%    44.8%    58.8% 
   Standard Deviation  8.0%  15.9%    17.4%    17.7% 
   Minimum  1.4%   3.0%    14.5%    15.8% 
   Maximum  47.0%  87.2%    82.1%    93.4% 